Corporate governance and international location decisions of multinational enterprises by Dam, L. et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Corporate governance and international location decisions of multinational enterprises
Dam, L.; Scholtens, B.; Sterken, E.
Published in:
Corporate Governance - An International Review
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00649.x
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2007
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Dam, L., Scholtens, B., & Sterken, E. (2007). Corporate governance and international location decisions of
multinational enterprises. Corporate Governance - An International Review, 15(6), 1330-1347.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00649.x
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Corporate Governance and
International Location Decisions of
Multinational Enterprises
Lammertjan Dam*, Bert Scholtens and Elmer Sterken
This paper analyses international location decisions of corporations based on corporate gov-
ernance considerations. Using ﬁrm level data on 540 Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) with
44,149 subsidiaries in 188 countries, we test whether ﬁrms with relatively good governance
standards are more often located in countries with a weak governance system. We ﬁnd empiri-
cal support for this hypothesis, especially for those corporations present in low-income
countries.
Keywords: Corporate governance, location behaviour, corporate social responsibility, multi-
national enterprises
1. Introduction
T his paper analyses whether corporateinternational location decisions are driven
by differences in national governance systems.
For example, do multinational ﬁrms look for
direct investment opportunities in countries
with weaker governance than at home? A ﬁrm
that is confronted with high pressure from
stakeholders at home might ﬁnd it attractive to
shift production to an economy with less strict
governance codes. In this way, domestic cor-
porate governance institutions might impact
international location choices in a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
way. For instance, environmental and human
rights pressure groups’ actions with respect to
Royal Dutch and Nike have affected their cor-
porate governance codes as well as their inter-
national production and location decisions.
Firms that have weak corporate governance
codes might consider it more proﬁtable to
produce with capital intensive technologies in
a country with a well-structured governance
system. In general, economic theory on inter-
national location decisions argues that these
decisions depend on the one hand on a
number of standard factors (a comprehensive
theoretical discussion is given by Billington,
1999), but on the other hand also on institu-
tions, like the quality of environment, political,
legal, and social factors (Boddewyn, 1988).
In order to improve our understanding of
the role of institutions in general in Multina-
tional Enterprises’ (MNEs) location decisions,
we need insight into the impact of governance
institutions on location decisions. Firms that
e.g. are inclined to be relieved from share-
holder pressure may want to start or continue
business in economies with less strict codes.
Conversely, ﬁrms with rather poor gover-
nance standards that want to start a project,
may be interested in locating in countries
with well-developed governance standards. It
remains an empirical issue to identify these
two views.
This paper starts with a brief review of the
literature on international location activity, the
candidate role for governance institutions and
the corporate performance-governance nexus
in section 2. As we show, there is relatively
little attention for the role of institutions like
governance in this literature so far. In section
3 we argue that in order to establish an active
role for governance, we need to know about
the interaction between corporate perfor-
mance and governance. Next, we describe
in section 3 the data and discuss the descrip-
tive statistics. In section 4 we present our
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methodology. Section 5 gives the analysis and
results. Finally, in section 6, we summarise and
conclude.
2. International location activity,
governance, and ﬁrm performance
In this section, we review the literature on
international location decisions, the candidate
role of institutions in general and governance
in particular, and the impact of governance on
ﬁrm performance.
International location decisions by MNEs
are complex corporate decisions. Two strands
of literature describe the main determinants
of location choice: the traditional theory on
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (see e.g.
Markusen, 1995) and the so-called new eco-
nomic geography (see e.g. Brakman et al.,
2001). The “traditional” theory focuses e.g. on
the role of local costs, access to production
factors, transportation costs, relative size and
market power. It is commonly believed that
so-called horizontal investments are more
likely in the case of large markets and high
transportation costs, while vertical invest-
ments arise when local costs are relatively low.
Besides these rather standard arguments,
public policy of course also affects location
decisions. The second strand of literature, the
new economic geography, focuses on spatial
imperfections that affect location choice and
performance. A ﬁrm might want to be in a
region where competitors run a successful
business, but increased competition reduces
this attractiveness.
According to Blonigen (2005), the growth of
MNE activity in the form of foreign FDI has
grown faster than most other international
transactions in the last decades. Therefore it
is important to know what the determinants
of MNEs’ location decisions are. Empirical
research on factors that determine FDI patterns
and the impact of MNEs on parent and host
countries is in its developing stage. As Bloni-
gen (2005) argues, the literature has shown
that it cannot simply be concluded that factors
such as exchange rates or tax policies have an
unambiguous general impact on FDI patterns.
Blonigen discusses that ﬁrm-speciﬁc charac-
teristics, like the availability of intangible
assets, such as technologies or managerial
skills, are important, but typically hard to
measure, and so are problematic in empirical
studies. Using empirical proxies, like R&D
and advertising, reveals that ﬁrms that lack
innovation, as compared to their peers, typi-
cally are engaged more in FDI (see Blonigen,
1997).
One can distinguish partial and general
equilibrium approaches to FDI and location
decisions.1 In partial equilibrium models,
exchange rate effects, taxes, and tariffs are
used as determinants. For instance, if a cur-
rency appreciates, the price of a local project
will decrease for a foreign investor, but the
nominal return on the project’s probably will
not. Tax issues are most complicated and
empirical evidence of the impact of changes in
corporate and indirect tax rates is mixed at
least (see e.g. Desai et al., 2004). Trade protec-
tion might be another determinant of interna-
tional MNE location decisions. If a ﬁrm can
avoid tariffs by substituting production for
exports, this would be a high-potential candi-
date determinant of location decisions.
Belderbos (1997) indeed ﬁnds evidence of this
so-called tariff-jumping FDI.
Blonigen (2005) points at the potentially
valuable role of institutions as a determinant
of FDI, particularly for less-developed econo-
mies. For example, poor legal protection of
assets increases the chances of expropriation
of corporate assets, reducing the probability of
FDI. Poor quality of institutions also lowers
expected proﬁtability and, therefore, reduces
the probability of successful FDI. Blonigen
further argues that it is hard to ﬁnd good
empirical proxies for institutions, since these
are typically hard to measure. Most measures
are composite indices developed from survey
responses from government ofﬁcials and busi-
nessmen familiar with the country involved.
This troubles cross-country comparability,
because the sampling of respondents might
differ per country. An exception is the direct
measurement of institutions like legal stan-
dards (see La Porta et al., 1997), which have
been extensively used in the literature on
ﬁnance and development. Legal institutions
can be measured directly from legal codes, but
still are prone to interpretation issues if it
comes to details (like the measurement of
shareholder protection). Another problem in
the empirical literature that tries to estimate
the impact of the role of institutions on eco-
nomic variables is the fact that institutions
tend to change very slowly. This troubles
our country time series analysis and favours
a cross-sectoral approach (see for instance
Levine and Zervos, 1998, for an example in the
law and ﬁnance literature). One of the institu-
tional variables used in some of the FDI litera-
ture is corruption: Wei (2000) for instance ﬁnds
that FDI is negatively related to corruption, but
Wheeler and Mody (1992) do not ﬁnd support
for the negative role of corruption.
Other examples of empirical partial loca-
tion studies are e.g. Basile et al. (2003) and
Yamawaki (2006) on FDI in the EU. These
studies estimate (conditional) choice models of
location decisions. The econometric speciﬁca-
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tion is mostly a (nested) logit model of the
binary choices to be represented in a speciﬁc
country. Boddewyn (1988) points out that
the non-market environment to a large extent
affects the efﬁciency of MNE performance.
The literature acknowledges that politics is of
great importance to MNEs (see Ring et al.,
1990; Brewer, 1992; Sundaram and Black, 1992;
Murtha and Lenway 1994), but that other
actors are not well covered (Baron, 2001).
Dunning (1993) argues that any theory of
MNE activity that does not seek to understand
and explain the role of governments and other
stakeholders as just another variable impacting
upon ﬁrm behaviour is bound to be deﬁcient.
There also is a literature on FDI location deci-
sions and political country risk. The empirical
literature ﬁnds mixed results. Oneal (1994)
ﬁnds that authoritarian regimes provide
higher returns to investors. Li and Resnick
(2003) show that non-democratic institutions
attract higher levels of FDI. Busse (2004), on
the other hand, ﬁnds that democratic institu-
tions lead to a higher inﬂow of FDI. Jensen
(2003) ﬁnds that MNEs pay lower premiums
for political risk insurance coverage in demo-
cratic regimes.
We focus on governance in international
location decisions. Firms having footage in an
economy with strict governance codes may
ﬁnd it attractive to shift operations to countries
with less strict governance codes. The latter
type of behaviour can be compared with the
so-called pollution haven hypothesis that
holds in environmental economics: a polluting
ﬁrm looks for a county that allows more pol-
lution than its home country (Letchumanan
and Kodama, 2000). But the evidence might
also turn to the opposite: ﬁrms beneﬁt from
well-developed governance and can freely
expand corporate activity. Then, our null
hypothesis is that the governance standard of
the ﬁrm is not related to its international loca-
tion decision. A null hypothesis also is that the
governance standard of the country of destina-
tion is not related to its attractiveness with
respect to FDI. The alternative hypothesis in
both cases is that governance does matter. Fur-
thermore, we explicitly test whether ﬁrms
with relatively low (high) governance stan-
dards are more often locating in countries with
relatively low (high) governance standards.
Among others, we will also condition for
wealth of the host country.
A precondition for an effective role of gov-
ernance though is that governance affects cor-
porate performance. Therefore, it is important
to shortly review corporate governance and
the different views on the performance-
governance nexus. Governance is deﬁned as
the set of informal arrangements that are
used in handling the consequences of these
unforeseen states of the world. Since the
work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), control
rights of ﬁnanciers are considered to be the
key elements in governance, especially if
ownership is widely spread (see Dyck and
Zingales, 2004). Nowadays listed ﬁrms are
required to satisfy ingenious governance
codes, which basically enable ﬁnanciers to get
a more direct inﬂuence on corporate deci-
sions. There is a fundamental debate on the
relation between governance and perfor-
mance though. Agency costs that arise from
the differences in interest of managers and
ﬁnanciers can lead to either over- or underin-
vestment. The most famous strand of the lit-
erature is that on overinvestment, as initiated
by Jensen and Meckling (1976): Managers try
to beneﬁt from the fact that they have access
to information that is undisclosed to outsid-
ers, especially if objectives and/or risk atti-
tudes of managers and banks are not aligned
due to pay-off structures or intrinsic motiva-
tions of the managers (see also Tirole, 2006).
For instance, managers may try to enjoy
fringe beneﬁts, set up “small empires”, or
engage in risky projects – activities which are
partly unobservable to the bank and not nec-
essarily performance enhancing.
Information asymmetries can also lead to
underinvestment. First, when creditors have
less information about a ﬁrm and its invest-
ment prospects, they will demand a premium
for supplying more ﬁnance. Consequently, the
cost of external funds will exceed that for inter-
nal funds (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989,
for a theoretical exposition and Whited, 1992,
for an empirical support). Second, underin-
vestment may also arise because of managerial
shirking. In the model of Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999), managers forego proﬁtable
projects that have net private costs to them.
These costs are generated by increased over-
sight due to the new investment project. Third,
the “Managerial Myopia” model argues that
e.g. equity markets may not allocate capital
efﬁciently because of the absence of dedicated
investors with a long-term horizon (see, for
example von Thadden, 1995; Tirole 2006,
p. 300).
Thus a more strict governance code might
lead to a better or worse performance of the
ﬁrm. Therefore, it remains an empirical issue
whether ﬁrms like to operate in more strict
governance environments. It is likely that
ﬁrms that want to be freed from local pres-
sure are trying to locate ﬁrm activity in coun-
tries with less strict governance codes and
ways of conduct. We test our main hypothesis
whether ﬁrms with relatively low governance
standards are more often located in countries
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with poor governance related regulations,
i.e. a weak business environment, condition-
ing for “normal” determinants of location
choices. It appears that ﬁrms with a relatively
high quality of corporate governance do not
avoid countries with poor governance stan-
dards. Next, we test whether these results
hold especially for low-income countries,
because these countries in general have
poorer governance structures. Our data sup-
port this second hypothesis as well. We will
focus explicitly on the governance of corrup-
tion, of business ethics, and corporate social
responsibility (driven by data availability).
These indicators are, of course, closely corre-
lated at the ﬁrm level with other indicators of
corporate governance, like the composition of
the board of directors, compensation, owner-
ship, etc.
3. Data
Data on ﬁrm responsibility is taken from the
Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS).
EIRIS has composed a cross-sectional dataset
which covers 2685 MNEs, located across the
globe, and contains information on company
policy, corporate reporting as well as on
breaches by or convictions of the MNE. The
topics that are included are environmental
issues, stakeholder issues, governance, busi-
ness ethics, and genetic engineering. Ratings
between -1 and 3 are assigned. The details on
Corporate Social Responsibility-scoring are
in Table B of the Appendix. We use four in-
dicators of governance quality: Governance of
bribery and corruption, Governance code of ethics,
Governance code of ethics systems and Gover-
nance of business principles. This choice is
mainly driven by data availability. Indicators of
the quality of governance of corruption, busi-
ness ethics, and corporate social responsibility,
of course are correlated to other indicators of
the quality of shareholder inﬂuence, like own-
ership, board composition, etc. We consider
these indicators to have an underlying latent
variable that measures the quality of a ﬁrm’s
governance. We apply factor analysis on the
four indicators to generate a single factor,
named “Governance”, and use this factor in our
econometric analysis.
Data on the international location of ﬁrms
is extracted from the reported subsidiaries
of European ﬁrms. To this extent, we use
AMADEUS, a database that contains account-
ing information for a large number of Euro-
pean ﬁrms. Note that a subsidiary can have
subsidiaries itself. Accordingly, AMADEUS
classiﬁes subsidiaries at different accounting
levels, where each subsidiary level is divided
into sublevels. We look at the subsidiaries at
the highest reported level and use information
on the country location of the subsidiary and
the most recent information on sales and
assets of the subsidiary (2004–2005). Our start-
ing point is the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 selection
list of largest European companies. After omit-
ting ﬁnancials and banks, we created a pooled
and balanced cross-section data set of the 540
companies. Table 1 gives an overview of the
number of MNEs in our dataset, classiﬁed by
the country in which the company is chartered
and by the industry the company is in. Overall,
most MNEs are based in the UK and a ranking
of the number of MNEs in each country is in
accordance with what one would expect given
countries’ population sizes. An exception is
Switzerland, which is relatively overrepre-
sented. For each company we have informa-
tion on its presence in 233 countries, yielding
a vector of 125,820 observations. Surely, not
each individual ﬁrm has operations in every
country. Impressively however, in 188 of the
233 countries, at least one multinational is
present. Table 2 gives an overview of the
average number of countries an MNE is oper-
ating in by region and industry. We also visua-
lise the global presence of MNEs in Figure 1.
On average, an MNE is active in 17 countries.
Firms producing basic materials are on
average active in more countries than ﬁrms in
other industries, mainly because they have a
large share of activities in the European
market. It appears that the oil and gas industry
is most evenly scattered across the globe. The
utilities industry scores the lowest on interna-
tional presence. Moreover, most MNEs are
active in the U.S. and Canada. The Eastern
Asian, European and NorthAmerican markets
are by far the most attractive in absolute as
well as in relative numbers.
We also extracted ﬁrm speciﬁc control vari-
ables from the AMADEUS database. Here, we
aim at variables that give a description of the
structure of the ﬁrm, as the literature treats
the location and the governance of the ﬁrm
as structural characteristics too. The ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables are Age of the MNE in years,
number of Employees, Leverage, as measured
by debt divided by total assets, and Liquidity.
Furthermore, we extracted Market Capitalisa-
tion in billions of euros from the Dow Jones
Stoxx 600 selection list. As such, we include
both accounting (i.e. book) and ﬁnancial
market data to describe the structure of the
ﬁrm. An overview of the descriptive statistics
of the variables is in Table 3. We need to
control for the individual conditioning
drivers of location decisions. For example,
ﬁrm size, measured by the number of
employees or age of the ﬁrm, the cash posi-
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tion, measured by liquidity, and borrowing
capacity, measured by leverage, all can have
an impact on location decisions.
If one compares the median to the mean
values of the variables Age, Employees, Leverage
and Liquidity in Table 3, it becomes clear that
these variables are characterised by a heavily
skewed distribution. For example, the average
MNE has 35,048 employees, whereas the
median MNE has 12,854 employees. To control
for the statistical consequences of these
skewed distributions we use the natural
logarithm of the variables in estimation. As
expected, Employees and Market Capitalisation
are highly correlated (correlation coefﬁcient
equals 0.61; see the right hand side of Table 3).
Larger ﬁrms require both more capital and
more labour. Age shows a signiﬁcant correla-
tion with Employees as well as with Market
Capitalisation. One can argue that growth of
MNEs is initially high, but as a certain level of
size is reached, the additional years will not
matter. Liquidity and Leverage do not show sig-
niﬁcant correlations with other ﬁrm character-
istics. Furthermore, Table 3 reveals that the
quality of corporate governance – as repre-
sented by our variable Governance – does not
show a signiﬁcant correlation with any other
variable.
To measure a country’s governance stan-
dard we use the Kaufmann et al. (2005) dataset.
This dataset presents estimates of six dimen-
sions of governance covering 209 countries
and territories for ﬁve time periods: 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. The dimensions are
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability
and Absence of Violence, Government Effec-
tiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption. Higher levels indicate
better regulation in a country and/or less
uncertainty in the business environment. We
provide detailed variable deﬁnitions in Table B
of the Appendix.
4. Methodology
A commonly used econometric modelling
technique in the literature of location choice, is
the conditional logit model (see McFadden,
1974). We stay close to the literature and adopt
this binary location choice model. We assume



































































Austria 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 5
Belgium 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 10
Switzerland 5 4 1 8 10 0 2 1 0 31
Germany 5 9 7 7 14 0 3 1 2 48
Denmark 0 2 0 5 3 0 0 1 0 11
Spain 0 2 10 1 8 3 2 2 6 34
Finland 3 2 2 0 2 1 2 1 0 13
France 2 12 14 2 13 2 8 1 2 56
United Kingdom 15 32 73 9 61 7 19 6 12 234
Greece 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 2 1 8
Italy 0 4 7 0 4 2 1 3 6 27
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Netherlands 2 5 4 1 4 4 5 1 0 26
Norway 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 7
Portugal 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 4
Sweden 3 4 2 3 9 1 1 2 0 25
All 40 79 125 37 135 22 44 26 32 540
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Africa (58) 2.1 2.1 0.7 0.8 1.5 3.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.3
Antarctica (4) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Caribbean and Bahamas (21) 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.3
Central and North America (13) 2.6 2.2 0.9 2.4 1.8 2.5 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.7
Eastern Asia (25) 4.3 3.6 1.2 3.9 2.4 2.1 2.6 0.8 0.4 2.4
Europe (45) 12.0 11.2 6.2 12.0 9.3 8.0 8.3 7.4 4.6 8.7
Middle East (15) 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5
Oceania (29) 1.0 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6
South America (13) 2.8 2.1 0.7 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.5
Western Asia (10) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
World (233) 25.8 23.4 10.5 22.6 18.3 21.1 15.3 12.0 8.0 17.0
The table entries are industry averages of the number of countries an MNE is operating in per region. Total
number of countries per region is in parentheses. A list of countries included is in Table A in the Appendix.











Figure 1: Global presence of multinational enterprises
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that the choice of the subsidiary location is the
dependent variable. For each MNE we explain
the choice of whether or not to be present in
a country. We construct a binary variable Yij
which is equal to 1 if company i has at least
one subsidiary in country j. We assume that
the beneﬁts (i.e. the proﬁtability) Bij to MNE
i (i = 1, . . . , N) of locating in country j (i = 1,
. . . , J) is a latent variable:
B Dij ij ij= + ε
Here, Dij is the deterministic part and eij the
error term. Dij is related to country characteris-
tics zj and parent-level ﬁrm group characteris-
tics xkj in the following way:
D x zij kj j= +β γ
Here, we put a subscript j in the term xkj, since
we do not a priori exclude possible interaction
between parent-level ﬁrm group characteris-
tics and country characteristics. The MNE
chooses the location if the beneﬁts are large
enough, say larger than a threshold B*, and we
only observe this outcome. The probability of
observing MNE i choosing location j is:
P P Y P B Bij ij ij= =( ) = >( )1 *
The actual outcome, given Dij, eventually
depends on the distribution of the error terms
eij. We want to test whether there is a signiﬁ-
cant interaction effect between a ﬁrm’s cor-
porate governance scores and a country’s
business environment and therefore delegate
any direct country effect to the country ﬁxed
effects. Unfortunately, this means that we
cannot observe which country characteristics
drive its attractiveness to MNEs besides gov-
ernance issues. As such, we ensure that we
fully control for observable and unobservable
country characteristics. We add the following
ﬁrm level control variables: Age, Employees,
Leverage (as measured by debt divided by total
assets), Liquidity, and Market Capitalisation.
Due to skewness of the distribution of most of
the variables, we take the logarithms, except
for Leverage. Furthermore, we create a “home”
dummy, which is equal to one if we consider
subsidiaries located in the same country as
where the MNE is based. We omit the obser-
vations for which this dummy is equal to one.
There has been some debate whether cultural
distance is an important determinant in inter-
national diversiﬁcation, e.g. a meta-analysis by
Tihanyi et al. (2005) indicates that these differ-
ences do not seem to matter, particularly for
MNEs based outside the US. Nonetheless, we
add a colonial dummy variable, which is equal
to one if the country where the subsidiary is
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where the MNE is headquartered. Please note
that cultural variables are all well approxi-
mated by this dummy (see also Tihanyi et al.,
2005).
5. Results
We estimate the following equation:
E Y Country Industry
FormerColony Firm
Gove
ij j j k
i i











Yij = 1, if MNE i is present in country j. L is the
logistic function. We estimate a conditional
logit function and condition on Country ﬁxed
effects. Firmi are the reported ﬁrm characteris-
tics, Industry are industry dummies, and
FormerColony is a dummy which indicates if a
country is a former colony of the country
where the MNE is based. For Business Environ-
ment, we use Control of Corruption, Government
Effectiveness, Political Stability, Regulatory
Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountabil-
ity. Higher values of Governance indicate better
Corporate Governance, higher values of Busi-
ness Environment indicate better regulation
and/or lower levels of uncertainty. To account
for potential clustering, we calculate t-values
using the Huber-White robust standard errors.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.
Note that in Table 4 we do not report
country and industry ﬁxed effects. We see that
in all ﬁve equations, the parameter estimates of
the number of Employees, the Market Capitali-
sation and Age are signiﬁcant. Clearly, larger
and older ﬁrms operate in more countries,
since they have had the time to grow and the
resources to expand. With respect to our ﬁnan-
cial indicators, we ﬁnd that the impact of
Liquidity is signiﬁcantly positive and that of
Leverage is signiﬁcantly negative. Having
enough liquid assets within the ﬁrm seems to
be a requirement for international expansion.
Furthermore, highly leveraged ﬁrms seem to
be hindered with respect to international
expansion. In all our estimations, the estimated
parameter of FormerColony is positive and
signiﬁcant, indicating that colonial history
remains to be important for current business
affairs. Recall that the FormerColony dummy
is almost identical to a common language
dummy, so we cannot determine whether the
observed positive effect is purely due to his-
torical ties, or due to a comparative advantage
in communication.
The quality of corporate governance – as
reﬂected by our variable Governance – has a
positive inﬂuence on international location
decisions. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and robust
relation between the quality of corporate gov-
ernance and country business environment.
The parameter estimates of the interaction
between on the one hand Governance and on
the other hand Control of Corruption, Govern-
ment Effectiveness, Political Stability, Regulatory
Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and Accountabil-
ity are all negative and signiﬁcant. From this
result, it appears that ﬁrms with relatively
better corporate governance do not avoid
countries with poor governance standards:
these ﬁrms are relatively more often located in
those countries. This was to be expected, as
this type of location choice behaviour can only
be advocated successfully to the stakeholders
of the company when corporate governance
standards are high. In this case, various stake-
holders trust the MNE to deal with unforeseen
events in the appropriate way. Apparently,
only companies that have strong corporate
governance can deal with uncertainties that
are associated with operating in countries with
poor governance.
Additionally, we split our sample in three
groups of countries, high-income, middle-
income, and least-developed countries2 to
assess whether the level of economic develop-
ment has an impact on the location decision-
governance nexus. Table 5 provides the results
of the estimations for the sub sample of Low
Income Countries (non-OECD countries and
other non-high income countries as classiﬁed
by the World Bank). Table 5 shows virtually
the same results as in Table 4. However, if we
estimate the same model for the high-income
countries,3 we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant interaction
effect between ﬁrm governance and country
governance indicators. This indicates that espe-
cially when it comes to location decisions in
developing countries, governance does matter.
To illustrate the differences between high-
income, middle-income, and least-developed
countries we present the estimation results for
one of the country governance indicators,
Control of Corruption. These results (presented
in columns 1–4 of Table 6) are representative
for the results of each individual indicator.
On the basis of Table 6, we establish that the
interaction effect that we ﬁnd for the entire
sample is not signiﬁcant when we focus on the
high-income countries, but it is signiﬁcant at
the 1 per cent signiﬁcance level for the low-
and middle-income countries and at the 5 per
cent signiﬁcance level for the lowest income
countries. Apparently, corporate governance
standards are more important for location
decisions when it comes to governance differ-
ences in developing countries. In short, only
MNEs with high governance standards choose
to locate in countries with poor business envi-
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ronments, and this is especially true for low-
income countries. Table 6 also reveals that the
ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm as indicated by
leverage is not relevant to location decisions in
high-income countries, but it is so in middle-
and lower-income countries.
The results can in fact be interpreted in two
ways. The evidence suggests that there are
opportunities for good corporate governance
companies to locate their subsidiaries in coun-
tries with less strict governance systems.
Second, it could be that there are incentives for
bad corporate governance companies to shift
some operations to countries with stronger
governance rules. Whether the negative sign of
the interaction between company and country
governance indicators is due to the ﬁrst
hypothesis or the second is unclear so far.
We therefore split up our sample in subsets
of high-governance and low-governance-
countries and estimate our model, omitting
the now obsolete interaction effect. The estima-
Table 4: Country presence of MNEs and corporate governance















Log MarketCapitalisation 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.237***
(13.77) (13.73) (13.79) (13.75) (13.72) (13.85)
Log Age 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.303***
(19.83) (19.85) (19.87) (19.85) (19.83) (19.85)
Log Liquidity 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.253***
(9.42) (9.43) (9.42) (9.42) (9.43) (9.39)
Leverage -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.303*** -0.303*** -0.304*** -0.303***
(-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-2.67) (-2.66)
Log employees 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.411***
(22.68) (22.69) (22.66) (22.69) (22.69) (22.65)
Former Colony 0.671*** 0.672*** 0.665*** 0.667*** 0.673*** 0.655***
(5.23) (5.23) (5.17) (5.21) (5.23) (5.09)
Governance 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.045** 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.053***
(3.40) (3.74) (2.30) (3.39) (3.33) (2.70)
Governance ¥ -0.086***








Rule of Law (-5.91)
Governance ¥ -0.084***
Voice and Accountability (-4.58)
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148
Number of Observations 81,597 82,058 82,058 81,597 82,058 82,058
The estimated logit model is: Presence = E[Yij] = L(aj Countryj + bk Industry + h FormerColony + giFirmi+ d(Governancei ¥ Business Environ-
mentj)). Yij = 1 if MNE i is present in country j.L is the logistic function, conditional onCountry ﬁxed effects. FormerColony = 1 if the country
is a former colony of the country where the MNE is based. Firmi are the reported ﬁrm characteristics. Industry are industry dummies. For
Business Environment we use Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and
Accountability respectively. Higher values of Governance indicate better Corporate Governance, higher values of Business Environment
indicate better regulation and/or lower levels of uncertainty. For brevity sake, the country and industry ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Deﬁnitions of the variables are in Table B of the appendix. The t-values are calculated using the Huber-White robust standard
errors.* indicates signiﬁcance at ten, ** at ﬁve, and *** at one per cent, respectively.
1338 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Volume 15 Number 6 November 2007 © 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007
tion results are in columns 5–6 of Table 6.
Column 6 of Table 6 reveals that for the subset
of low-governance countries, the coefﬁcient
of the ﬁrm governance indicator is positive
and signiﬁcant, implying that good-
governance companies are relatively more
often present in these countries. We therefore
conclude that we should interpret the negative
sign as evidence that there are incentives for
good corporate governance companies to
locate their subsidiaries in countries with less
strict governance systems.
6. Conclusion
This paper analyses the international location
behaviour of multinational enterprises by
Table 5: Country presence in low and middle income countries of MNEs and corporate governance















Log Market Capitalisation 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.254***
(10.69) (10.61) (10.69) (10.66) (10.67) (10.72)
Log Age 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333***
(16.02) (16.05) (16.05) (16.02) (16.01) (16.02)
Log Liquidity 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.180***
(5.59) (5.61) (5.59) (5.58) (5.60) (5.58)
Leverage -0.837*** -0.837*** -0.838*** -0.838*** -0.838*** -0.838***
(-5.14) (-5.14) (-5.15) (-5.14) (-5.14) (-5.15)
Log employees 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 0.492***
(24.14) (24.16) (24.14) (24.14) (24.16) (24.14)
Former Colony 0.799*** 0.805*** 0.800*** 0.797*** 0.805*** 0.798***
(4.37) (4.39) (4.33) (4.33) (4.40) (4.33)
Governance 0.032 0.051** 0.035 0.051** 0.035 0.053**
(1.45) (2.13) (1.60) (2.25) (1.60) (2.39)
Governance ¥ -0.102***








Rule of Law (-3.09)
Governance ¥ -0.044*
Voice and Accountability (-1.78)
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.170
Number of Observations 61,313 61,313 61,313 61,313 61,313 61,313
The estimated logit model is: Presence = E[Yij] = L(aj Countryj + bk Industry + h FormerColony + giFirmi + d(Governancei ¥ Business Environ-
mentj)). Yij = 1 if MNE i is present in country j.L is the logistic function, conditional onCountry ﬁxed effects. FormerColony = 1 if the country
is a former colony of the country where the MNE is based. Firmi are the reported ﬁrm characteristics. Industry are industry dummies. For
Business Environment we use Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Voice and
Accountability respectively. Higher values of Governance indicate better Corporate Governance, higher values of Business Environment
indicate better regulation and/or lower levels of uncertainty. For brevity sake, the country and industry ﬁxed effects are not reported.
Deﬁnitions of the variables are in Table B of the appendix. The t-values are calculated using the Huber-White robust standard
errors.* indicates signiﬁcance at ten, ** at ﬁve, and *** at one per cent, respectively.
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explicitly taking account of governance. We
analyse governance from the perspective of the
ﬁrm (corporate governance), as well as from
the national perspective (business environ-
ment). To this extent, we use a binary location
choice model that describes corporate interna-
tional location decisions. We investigate the
internationalisation patterns of 540 European
multinationals with more than 40 thousand
subsidiaries in 188 countries. We explicitly test
whether ﬁrms with relatively low governance
standards are more often locating in countries
with low governance related regulations, i.e.
a weak business environment, conditioning
for “normal” determinants of location choices.
It appears that ﬁrms with a relatively high
quality of corporate governance do not avoid
to locate in countries with poor governance
standards. This is based on the observation that
these ﬁrms are relatively more often located
in countries with poor domestic governance
codes. A possible explanation is that this type
of location choice behaviour can only be advo-
cated successfully to the stakeholders of the
company when corporate governance stan-
dards are high indeed. In this case, the various
stakeholders might trust the internationally
operating ﬁrm to deal with unforeseen events
in an appropriate manner. Apparently, only
companies that have strong corporate gover-
nance are able to deal with the uncertainties
that are associated with low standards of gov-
ernance in the destination country. In addition,
we ﬁnd that our results are stronger for low-
Table 6: Differences in MNE presence for various country samples

















Number of countries 152 38 114 87 71 81
Variable Coefﬁcient
(t-value)
Log Market Capitalisation 0.236*** 0.207*** 0.253*** 0.272*** 0.210*** 0.286***
(13.74) (8.63) (10.67) (8.54) (11.05) (8.13)
Log Age 0.303*** 0.266*** 0.333*** 0.366*** 0.277*** 0.361***
(19.82) (11.87) (16.03) (14.46) (14.43) (14.80)
Log Liquidity 0.254*** 0.327*** 0.181*** 0.134*** 0.311*** 0.112***
(9.42) (7.93) (5.59) (3.51) (9.34) (3.14)
Leverage -0.303*** 0.189 -0.838*** -1.016*** -0.011 -1.049***
(-2.66) (1.41) (-5.14) (-4.52) (-0.09) (-5.21)
Log employees 0.411*** 0.340*** 0.492*** 0.480*** 0.378*** 0.503***
(22.68) (14.06) (24.14) (17.41) (17.20) (20.45)
Former Colony 0.669*** 0.432*** 0.800*** 0.716*** 0.577*** 0.739***
(5.20) (3.29) (4.35) (3.53) (3.59) (3.90)
Governance 0.072*** -0.008 0.042* 0.024 -0.014 0.064**
(3.44) (-0.13) (1.91) (0.65) (-0.63) (2.01)
Governance ¥ -0.106*** -0.014 -0.096*** -0.135**
Control of Corruption (-5.83) (-0.30) (-3.05) (-2.25)
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.132 0.171 0.177 0.137 0.180
Number of Observations 81,597 20,284 61,313 46,561 38,263 45,178
The estimated logit model is: Presence = E[Yij] = L(aj Countryj + bk Industry + h FormerColony + giFirmi + d(Governancei ¥ Business Environ-
mentj)). Yij= 1 if MNE i is present in country j.L is the logistic function, conditional on Country ﬁxed effects. FormerColony = 1 if the country
is a former colony of the country where the MNE is based. Firmi are the reported ﬁrm characteristics. Industry are industry dummies. For
Business Environment we use one combined factor score based on the six Business Environment indicators. Higher values of Governance
indicate better Corporate Governance, higher values of Business Environment indicate better regulation and/or lower levels of uncertainty.
In the High Governance and Low Governance Countries estimations, we dropped the interaction term. For brevity sake, the country and
industry ﬁxed effects are not reported. Deﬁnitions of the variables are in Table B of the appendix. The t-values are calculated using the
Huber-White robust standard errors.* indicates signiﬁcance at ten, ** at ﬁve, and *** at one per cent, respectively.
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income countries, implying that governance
standards are speciﬁcally important here.
These ﬁndings are very much in line with
other studies that focus on institutional deter-
minants of international location behaviour
(e.g. Basile, 2003; Li and Resnick, 2003; Bloni-
gen, 2005; Yamawaki, 2006). In all, we con-
clude that corporate governance does play a
signiﬁcant role too in international location
decisions of MNEs.
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Notes
1. We skip the discussion on general equilibrium
models here, since this discussion has little direct
relevance to our paper, and refer to Blonigen
(2005).
2. The distinction is based on the convention sug-
gested by the World Bank. Thus, high-income
countries have an average GDP per capita of
$10,066 in 2004 (54 countries), middle-income
countries have an average per capita income
between $826 and $10,065 in 2004 (93 countries),
and the least-developed countries have an
average per capita GDP below $ 825 in 2004 (61
countries).
3. These results are not reported but available on
request.
Appendix








Anguilla Caribbean and Bahamas
Antarctica Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda Caribbean and Bahamas
Argentina South America
Armenia Western Asia




Bahamas Caribbean and Bahamas
Bahrain Middle East
Bangladesh Eastern Asia
Barbados Caribbean and Bahamas
Belarus Europe
Belgium Europe
Belize Central and North America
Benin Africa
Bermuda Central and North America
Bhutan Eastern Asia
Bolivia South America
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Table A: Continued
Country Name Region
British Indian Ocean Territory Africa






Canada Central and North America
Cape Verde Africa
Cayman Islands Caribbean and Bahamas




China, People’s Republic of Eastern Asia
Christmas Islands Oceania




Congo (Democratic Republic of) Africa
Cook Islands Oceania
Costa Rica Central and North America
Côte d’Ivoire Africa
Croatia Europe





Dominica Caribbean and Bahamas
Dominican Republic Caribbean and Bahamas
Ecuador South America
Egypt Africa









Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Europe
France Europe
French Polynesia Oceania
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Greenland Central and North America
Grenada Caribbean and Bahamas
Guam Oceania




Haiti Caribbean and Bahamas
Heard Island and McDonald Islands Oceania
Holy See Europe
Honduras Central and North America
















Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Eastern Asia
Korea, Republic of Eastern Asia
Kuwait Middle East
Kyrgyzstan Western Asia
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Mexico Central and North America
Micronesia (Federated States of) Oceania
Moldova (Republic of) Europe
Mongolia Eastern Asia








Netherlands Antilles Caribbean and Bahamas
New Caledonia Oceania
New Zealand Oceania





Northern Mariana Islands Oceania
Norway Europe




Panama Central and North America















Sao Tome and Principe Africa
Saudi Arabia Middle East
Senegal Africa
Serbia and Montenegro Europe
Seychelles Africa
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South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands Antarctica
Spain Europe
Sri Lanka Eastern Asia
St Kitts and Nevis Caribbean and Bahamas
St Lucia Caribbean and Bahamas
St Pierre and Miquelon Central and North America






Syrian Arab Republic Middle East
Taiwan Eastern Asia
Tajikistan Western Asia














United Arab Emirates Middle East
United Kingdom Europe
United States Central and North America






Virgin Islands (British) Caribbean and Bahamas
Virgin Islands (US) Caribbean and Bahamas
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